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Recently, it has been argued that quantum mechanics is complete, and that quan-
tum states vectors are necessarily in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of
reality, under the assumptions that quantum theory is correct and that measurement
settings can be freely chosen. In this work, we argue that the adopted form of the
free choice assumption is stronger than needed. In our perspective, there are hidden
assumptions underlying these results, which limit their range of validity. We support
our argument by a model for the bipartite two-level system, reproducing quantum
mechanics, in which the free will assumption is respected, and different quantum
states can be connected to the same state of reality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics is one of the most successful theories ever developed. It has been
elaborated to account for the phenomena of the microscopic world and it has been experi-
mentally verified to an impressive degree of accuracy. It has required a radical change in the
scientific conception of nature particularly in connection with its indeterminism and nonlo-
cality. However, from a conceptual point of view, the theory is not immune of drawbacks.
The crucial point stays in the fact that it appears more as a set of operational prescriptions
to predict outcomes of prospective measurement procedures than a coherent description of
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2reality. Its range of validity is not clear, it relies on two different kinds of evolution depending
on the rather vague notion of measurement. As a consequence of these problematic aspects
it is not clear what is the conceptual status of the quantum state vector ψ, the mathematical
entity associated to the state of any physical system. After the famous incompleteness ar-
gument by Einstein, Podolski and Rosen [1], the question of whether ψ represents a state of
reality or rather a state of knowledge, as suggested by its updating following a measurement
procedure, remains unanswered.
In order to address some of these questions, several ontological models of quantum mechan-
ics have been introduced. These are theories predictively equivalent to quantum mechanics,
but providing a possibly richer description of microscopic reality in terms of the so-called
ontic state, i.e., the most accurate specification of the physical state of the system [2]. In
these theories, the state vector ψ might embody only partial information on the ontic state.
In particular, it is associated to a distribution ρψ(λ) on the space of the ontic variables, with
ρψ(λ) > 0 and ∫
ρψ(λ)dλ = 1 for allψ. (1)
The ontic state λ contains all the information about the elements of reality of the underlying
theory, and, accordingly, it provides the complete description of the state of the system [25].
In principle, λ can be not fully accessible. Ignorance of its precise value is deemed to be the
origin of various of the aforementioned problematic aspects of quantum mechanics.
In the past literature, ontological models were usually referred to as hidden variables
theories, meaning that additional variables, absent in the standard quantum formalism (and
for this reason named “hidden”), were expected to supplement the information given by ψ,
providing in this way a complete description of the physical situation. From the beginning,
this program had supporters as well as opponents. J. von Neumann proved that determinis-
tic hidden variables models were unviable [3], but later D. Bohm provided an explicit, fully
deterministic, hidden variable model predictively equivalent to quantum mechanics [4, 5].
Later J.S. Bell appropriately stressed that von Neumann’s impossibility theorem was circu-
lar, since it was based on logically unnecessarily strong assumptions [6]. He also proved that
any theory predictively equivalent to quantum mechanics must violate some inequalities,
named Bell’s inequalities after him, which are satisfied by any local theory [7].
Recently, a new argument supporting the completeness of quantum mechanics has been
presented in [8], based only on two assumptions: that quantum mechanics is correct (QM),
3and that a precise mathematical condition (FR) - which the authors believe to express the
request that measurement settings can be freely chosen - be satisfied. According to [8], any
completion of quantum mechanics which consistently reproduces its outcomes, necessarily
comes at the expenses of the free will of the observers in choosing the measurement settings.
Here, we argue that, similarly to the case of von Neumann argument against hidden vari-
ables theories, also this result is inconclusive due to the unappropriate formalization of the
assumption (FW ) of free will, which we will make precise in what follows. Specifically, we
provide evidence that the physically meaningful request of FW is not correctly expressed in
mathematical terms in [8], since the constraint FR, which stays at the basis of the authors’
argument, is unnecessarily stronger than FW . For related comments see [9–11].
Our criticism has relevant consequences concerning the meaning of the quantum state
vector ψ in ontological models. First of all, let us recall that the distributions ρψ(λ) might
have overlapping supports for different ψ, a property which characterizes the so-called ψ-
epistemic models. Alternatively, when the supports are always disjoint we are dealing with
ψ-ontic models [2]. According to this classification the state vector ψ acquires a strongly
different conceptual status. In fact, in a ψ-ontic theory different state vectors necessarily
correspond to different ontic states, whereas in a ψ-epistemic theory they could correspond
to the same ontic state. As a consequence, one can associate to ψ well defined elements of
reality only in the first case.
As it should be obvious, the distinction between ψ-epistemic and ψ-ontic models implies
completely different interpretations of the quantum state vector. For this reason, these
classes of models have recently been the subject of several investigations. A first argument
arguing that ψ-epistemic models necessarily contrast with quantum mechanics was developed
in [12], but its conclusions are severely limited by the assumption that factorized quantum
states correspond to factorized states of the underlying theory. In fact, an explicit ψ-
epistemic model has been built by relaxing this assumption [13]. Another no-go theorem for
ψ-epistemic models has been developed in [14], based on the completeness result presented
in [8]. Our arguments against the assumption FR make also this argument inconclusive in
determining the ontological status of the quantum state vector, since a weaker and more
significant condition of free will is still compatible with ψ-epistemic models. We substantiate
our argument by presenting an explicit ψ-epistemic model for a pair of two-level systems,
in which the experimenters can freely choose their local settings, so that FW holds, even
4though condition FR is violated.
Before proceeding, a relevant remark is at order. Here, and anywhere in this work, when
using the term reality we do not mean what the world is, but rather what the theory is about,
exactly in the spirit of Bell’s beables [15]:
I use the term beable rather than some more committed term like being or beer
to recall the essentially tentative nature of any physical theory.
We further assume that a complete description can be obtained by confining our attention
to a specific set of physical systems, the rest of the universe not contributing at all, as
appropriately required by Shimony, Horne and Clauser [16]:
Unless we proceed under the assumption that hidden conspiracies [...] do not
occur, we have abandoned in advance the whole enterprise of discovering the
laws of nature by experimentation.
Accordingly, we do not consider superdeterministic models in our analysis.
In Section II we review the completeness argument of [8], and its implications on the
interpretation of the state vector [14], by slightly modifying the original notations for sake of
clarity. We only describe the steps which are relevant to our analysis, and refer the interested
reader to the original papers for further details. In Section III we criticize the assumption
that the condition FR introduced in [8] correctly embodies the request FW of free will.
Actually, we shall prove that FR implies more than the free will of the experimenters,
and this will make clear how our analysis limits the results of [8, 14]. In Section IV we
substantiate our arguments by providing an explicit model in which the quantum state vector
is not in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of reality. Finally, in Section V, we
criticize a more recent argument supporting the completeness of quantum mechanics, and
we present our final remarks.
II. THE COMPLETENESS ARGUMENT OF COLBECK AND RENNER
We consider the standard EPR-like scenario: two space-like separated observers perform
local measurements on the two parties of an entangled state ψ. The measurement settings
on the two sides are given by vectors A and B, and the measurement outcomes by X
5and Y , whose values are in {−1, 1}. We assume that additional information on the ontic
state λ can be accessed through a measurement procedure with setting C and output Z.
All these quantities are assumed to be space-time random variables, whose values can be
associated to well-defined space-time points (t, r1, r2, r3), making precise the statement that
two measurement procedures and the associated outcomes are space-like with respect to
one another. All these quantities are described by joint conditional probabilities of the form
PXY Z|ABC, and similar ones. Generally, these probabilities are conditioned by ψ, but usually
this dependence will be left implicit for notational convenience.
The argument presented in [8] relies essentially on two assumptions, which we now re-
view. The first one, denoted by FR, is that the observers can independently choose the
measurements they perform. As explicitly stated in [8]:
Assumption FR is that the input, A, of a measurement process can be cho-
sen such that it is uncorrelated with certain other space-time random variables,
namely all those whose coordinates lie outside the future light-cone of the coor-
dinates of A.
This assumption holds true for B and C as well, and it is mathematically expressed (and this
is actually what the author’s mean by the request FR) through the following requirements
on the conditional probabilities:
PA|BCY Z = PA, PB|ACXZ = PB, PC|ABXY = PC . (2)
The second assumption, denoted by QM , is that quantum mechanics is correct [8]:
Measurement outcomes obey quantum statistics and [...] all processes within
quantum theory can be considered as unitary evolutions, if one takes into account
the environment. [Moreover] the second part of the assumption need only hold
for microscopic processes on short timescales.
Now, by relying only on these two assumptions, the authors of [8] prove that any knowledge
on the ontic state besides the one given by ψ is useless, since it cannot modify the outcome
distributions predicted by quantum mechanics: PXY |ABCZ = PXY |AB, PX|ABCZ = PX|A and
PY |ABCZ = PY |B. They conclude that [8]
6Any attempt to better explain the outcomes of quantum measurements is destined
to fail. Not only is the universe not deterministic, but quantum theory provides
the ultimate bound on how unpredictable it is. [...] under the assumption that
measurement settings can be chosen freely, quantum theory really is complete.
The technical details of their proof are not relevant here, since our criticism focuses on the
adoption of the assumption FR to formalize the request FW of the possibility of freely
choosing the apparatus settings. We point out that all the three constraints in (2) are
needed to prove this result and that these constraints imply the non-signalling conditions:
PY Z|ABC = PY Z|BC , PXZ|ABC = PXZ|AC , PXY |ABC = PXY |AB, (3)
so that no experimenter can extract, form his outcomes, any information about the measure-
ment settings which have been chosen by the other experimenters. This fact is physically
relevant since it avoids superluminal communication between them.
By adapting their argument, in [14] the same authors provide a no-go theorem for ψ-
epistemic models, ultimately based on the same assumptions FR and QM . They show
that PX|λA = PX|ψA, and then conclude that there should be a one-to-one correspondence
between λ and ψ. As before, the technical machinery leading to this conclusion is irrelevant
here, but we stress once more that also this result is a direct consequence only of the two
assumptions: FR and QM . In the following, we assume that QM is fulfilled, and we criticize
the identification of FR with the assumption FW of the free choice of measurement settings,
arguing that the latter can be satisfied even though FR is violated.
III. CRITICISM OF THE FR ASSUMPTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
As noticed by the authors of [8], their result has meaningful consequences when applied to
existing hidden variables models, notably, to Bohmian mechanics. Since this is a determinis-
tic completion of quantum mechanics, following the analysis of J.P. Jarrett, its non-locality
necessarily arises from a violation of the condition of parameter independence (PI), which
is expressed as
PX|ABλ = PX|Aλ, PY |ABλ = PY |Bλ. (4)
In the context of [8], PI reduces to PX|ABZ = PX|AZ and PY |ABZ = PY |BZ , since it is assumed
that the information represented by λ is fully accessible (and obtained by Z). This is by
7itself a constraint which limits the applicability of the results presented in [8], since it ignores
the important distinction between controllable and uncontrollable hidden variables, which
has been strongly emphasized by A. Shimony [17]. In fact, it is generally assumed that the
hidden variables are not completely accessible; that is, there can be some physical principles
which limit their knowledge and their manipulation, ensuring, first of all, the impossibility
of superluminal signalling. Maintaining the authors’ perspective on the accessibility of λ,
we observe that the non-signalling conditions (3) automatically imply PI, and therefore the
assumption FR trivially forbids all the deterministic completions of quantum mechanics.
In [8], this fact is interpreted by claiming that these models violate the assumption of free
choice. Nonetheless, as we have already mentioned and as we shall shortly prove, the FR
assumption cannot be considered as the appropriate formalization of the free will assumption
FW , since it embodies more than this assumption. Therefore, the violation of FR cannot
be automatically related to lack of free will.
To start with, we introduce the condition FW , which, in our opinion, provides a more
suitable expression for the free choice assumption. We observe that, when dealing with
correlation experiments of this type, one is merely interested in the freedom of choice of the
measurement settings A and B, located at the two wings of the experimental set-up. This
condition, when expressed in terms of conditional probabilities, reads
PA|Bλ = PA, PB|Aλ = PB, (5)
and it fully accounts for the fact that the two experimenters can freely and independently
choose which observable to measure, since it implies the factorization PABλ = PAPBPλ.
Notice that the assumption FW does not involve a third party, and its measurement setting
C. Actually, the authors of [8] remark that the additional information supplementing ψ
[...] must be static, that is, its behavior cannot depend on where or when it is
observed [...] so, we can consider the case where its observation is also space-like
separated from the measurements specified by A and B.
This statement intends to stress that FR is the appropriate way to express the free will
request, since it is consistent with the condition PC|ABXY = PC . Nonetheless, for future
reference, we take it as an independent assumption, denoted as ST , and expressed through
the condition
PCZ|ABXY = PCZ . (6)
8Notice that in [8] ST does not appear as an assumption, nor the mathematical expression
(6) appears somewhere: it is introduced by us in our criticism of the assumption FR.
There is another striking difference between the conditions FR and FW : the former
involves the random variables X and Y , the latter does not. We believe that it is important
to avoid this dependence, since the extra variablesX and Y could bring spurious correlations,
completely independent of the free will assumption. To clarify the idea, let us assume that we
are interested in the free choice of A, and let us raise the following question: if PA|BCY Z 6= PA,
can we conclude that A cannot be freely chosen? We do not think that this is the case. For
instance, we might suppose that the two Stern-Gerlach apparatuses located at the opposite
wings of the experiment could superluminally communicate, at a suitable finite speed. In
the rest frame of the two experimenters, the communication happens after the free choice
of A and B, and before the generation of the outputs X and Y . In this way, correlation
between A and Y might be produced. Even though it is highly implausible that a physical
process as the one just mentioned has any physical meaning, its consideration has nothing
to do with the fact that A and B can be freely and independently chosen. In other words,
we believe that a good mathematical formulation of the free measurements choice should
not automatically reject situations where free will and superluminal communication coexist.
Unfortunately, this is not the case when the FR assumption is considered, since it implies
the non-signalling constraints (3), as stated in Section II.
In accordance with the previous analysis, we find convenient to write non-signalling con-
ditions (which are independent from the additional information on the ontic state, and from
the setting of its measuring device) as follows:
PX|AB = PX|A, PY |AB = PY |B. (7)
They are weaker than relations (3), still they fully express the impossibility of superluminal
communication in the standard EPR scenario. In the following, we refer to Eq. (7) as the
NS assumption. As proven in [11], the relation between FR, FW , ST and NS is given by
FW ∧NS ∧ ST ⇒ FR, (8)
and, if the ontic state λ is fully accessible, also the inverse implication holds,
FR⇒ FW ∧NS ∧ ST. (9)
9Therefore, in the case considered in [8], the FR assumption is equivalent to the logical
conjunction of our assumptions FW of free will, staticity ST of the ontic state, and impos-
sibility of superluminal communication, NS. This result proves our statement that FR is
more than the free choice assumption, and shows that, even if the ontic state is (at least
partially) unaccessible, negation of FR does not necessarily imply absence of free will. It
might depend on a violation of free will, on the fact that the additional information on
λ is not static, or on a violation of the impossibility of superluminal communication. Of
those, the second condition appears the easiest to digest: why the extra information on λ,
which is complementing the information provided by the state vector ψ, should be static,
when ψ itself, and the measurement procedure involved in its preparation, are not space-like
separated with respect to A and B?
Therefore, the completeness argument presented in [8] has not the claimed generality,
although it is formally correct. When considering Bohmian mechanics, the statement that
measurement settings cannot be freely chosen is not justified. If we assume that λ is fully
accessible (that is, that all positions are known), it is a well known fact that the theory
allows superluminal communication. Otherwise, it is likely that the additional information
on the ontic state is not static (in fact, it should be a partial information on the positions,
which are distributed according to ψ, which in turn is certainly a non-static quantity). In
both cases, violation of FR does not require lack of free will.
The no-go theorem for ψ-epistemic theories derived in [14] is based on the assumptions
QM and FR. Therefore, the same conclusions apply to this case as well, and this result is
not general at all. Both the questions of whether quantum mechanics is a complete theory,
and the interpretation of the quantum state as a state of knowledge or an element of reality,
remain open. In the following section we present a ψ-epistemic model for a pair of two-level
systems, fully consistent with quantum mechanics, in which the measurement settings A
and B can be freely chosen.
IV. A ψ-EPISTEMIC MODEL FOR THE BIPARTITE SYSTEM
The model is a trivial application of the results of [13], where, however, it has not been
realized that the family of ψ-epistemic models therein presented are valid beyond the single
system case. Following our reasoning in the previous section, we can claim that superluminal
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influences of measurement choices upon ontic variables, in the multipartite case, are not
necessarily expected. Despite in [13] a system of arbitrary dimension is considered, here we
limit our attention to a pair of two-level systems for sake of simplicity.
The model is inspired by a generalization, to the case of two subsystems, of a Bell model
for a single two-level system. We start by describing this generalization. If we denote by
H the Hilbert space of the single system, an arbitrary quantum state vector is given by
ϕ ∈ H = HA ⊗ HB. The hidden variable is a real parameter τ ∈ T = [0, 1], and the ontic
state is given by the ordered pair λ = (ϕ, τ) ∈ H× T . Its distribution corresponding to the
quantum state ψ is given by
ρψ(λ) = ρψ(ϕ, τ) = δ(ϕ− ψ), (10)
that is, τ is uniformly distributed over T for all states ψ. We consider now the local
observables Aˆ = A · σA and Bˆ = B · σB, where the settings A and B are unit real vectors
in R3 and σA, σB are the vectors of Pauli matrices acting on HA and HB respectively. We
denote the common eigenvectors of the commuting observables Aˆ, Bˆ and Aˆ⊗ Bˆ as φj, and
we order them according to
|〈φj|0〉|
2
> |〈φj+1|0〉|
2 with j = 0, . . . , 3, (11)
where |0〉 ∈ H is an arbitrary reference state. The states φj are factorized, and they are
associated with well defined outcomes (X, Y ) for the observables Aˆ and Bˆ, which are in
the set {(−1,−1), (−1, 1), (1,−1), (1, 1)}. The outcome of Aˆ ⊗ Bˆ is given by the product
XY . The specific correspondence between j and the pairs of possible outcomes for X and
Y depends on the local observables taken into account, in the way we describe now. In the
ontic state λ = (ϕ, τ) the value of the projectors Φˆj = |φj〉〈φj| are defined as
Φj(λ) = 1, if
j−1∑
k=0
|〈φk|ϕ〉|
2
6 τ <
j∑
k=0
|〈φk|ϕ〉|
2, (12)
and Φj(λ) = 0 otherwise; when j = 0, the lower bound for τ is defined to be 0 (in this case
the former expression is meaningless). Therefore, with any λ there is associated a value
of j. Since the spectral decomposition of the local operators Aˆ and Bˆ (as well as that of
Aˆ⊗ Bˆ) can be written through the projectors ˆPhij , the corresponding outcomes X = X(λ)
and Y = Y (λ) (and, of course, their product) are unambiguously determined. They are
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distributed according to the quantum mechanical rules [13], since
∫
dλρψ(λ)Φj(λ) =
∫
dτΦj(ψ, τ) = |〈φj|ψ〉|
2. (13)
As the original Bell model for a single two-level system, this generalized model is ψ-ontic.
In fact, according to (10), the distributions corresponding to different state vectors never
overlap. However, this property is not needed at all in order to produce a model predictively
equivalent to quantum mechanics: it is sufficient that the measure of the support of the
function Φj(λ) over {(ϕ, τ), τ ∈ T} equals the quantum probability |〈φj|ψ〉|
2. Following [13],
by suitably redistributing this support, it is possible to turn the model into a ψ-epistemic
one. After noticing that |〈φ0|0〉|
2 > 1/4, the authors introduce
z(ϕ) = inf
φ:〈φ|0〉|2>1/4
|〈φ|ϕ〉|2, (14)
which is used to define a subset of the ontic space,
E0 = {(ϕ, τ) : |〈ϕ|0〉|
2 > 3/4 and 0 6 τ < z(ϕ)}. (15)
This set has the property that all λ ∈ E0 are in the support of Φ0 = |φ0〉〈φ0|. Therefore, these
ontic states have all the same outcome, which is the one associated with φ0. If we redistribute
over the whole of E0 the probabilities which the distribution ρψ(λ) in (10) assigns to ontic
states within E0 itself, we achieve the desired target. For example, by denoting by ρE0(λ)
the uniform distribution over E0, and by Θ(x) the unit-step function, such that Θ(x) = 1
for x > 0 and Θ(x) = 0 for x < 0, it is possible to define
ρ˜ψ(λ) = ρ˜ψ(ϕ, τ) =


δ(ϕ− ψ), for |〈ψ|0〉|2 6 3/4
δ(ϕ− ψ)Θ(x− z(ψ)) + z(ψ)ρE0(λ), for |〈ψ|0〉|
2 > 3/4
(16)
which, by construction, satisfies
∫
dλρ˜ψ(λ)Φj(λ) = |〈φj|ψ〉|
2, (17)
but in general produces overlapping supports for distinct state vectors. Therefore, if we
replace ρψ(λ) by ρ˜ψ(λ), we obtain a ψ-epistemic model for a pair of two-level systems.
There is not reason why the conditions FW and NS introduced in the previous section
should be violated, therefore we conclude that it is possible to build ψ-epistemic models
which do not ask for violations of the free will assumption, or superluminal communication.
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In this section we have adopted a weak notion of ψ-epistemic model: there must be at
least one pair of quantum state vectors whose corresponding distributions have overlapping
supports. A stronger definition requires that all non-orthogonal quantum states have over-
lapping distributions. While a detailed treatment of this case is out of the scopes of this
paper, we point out that our remarks on the expression of the free will assumption holds
true also in this case.
V. FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS
Recently, the authors of [8, 14] have provided a different argument leading to the same con-
clusion of completeness of quantum mechanics [18]. This work is presented as an expanded
and more pedagogical version of [8, 14], nonetheless it appears as a distinct derivation. For
instance, the result that quantum mechanics is maximally informative (that is, complete),
asks for different resources in the cases of maximally and non-maximally entangled states,
unlike [8, 14]. Here we are not interested in a general analysis of this work, but in inves-
tigating the assumption of free choice which appears in it, which is the most significative
requirement to draw the conclusions expressed in the paper. Following the authors [18],
[...] a parameter of the theory, say A, is considered free if it is possible to choose
A such that it is uncorrelated with all other values (described by the theory)
except those that lie in the causal future of A.
They consistently express this idea through a factorization of the probabilities PAΓA =
PAPΓA, where ΓA is the set of all random variables which are not in the causal future of
A. This condition must hold also for B, that is PBΓB = PBPΓB , where ΓB is the set of all
random variables which are not in the causal future of B.
Differently from the former assumption FR, this condition does not involve the random
variables C and Z, and therefore it is free from the former assumption of static variables,
ST . Nonetheless, as FR did, also this condition automatically satisfies NS, and therefore
it cannot coexist, neither in principle, with a theory allowing superluminal communication.
This can be derived by expressing PABX in different ways:
PABX = PX|ABPAB = PX|ABPAPB, (18)
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where, in the second step, we have considered that B ∈ ΓA; but also
PABX = PAXPB = PX|APAPB, (19)
where the first step follows from A ∈ ΓB andX ∈ ΓB. By comparing (18) and (19), we derive
the non-signalling condition PX|AB = PX|A; a similar argument proves that PY |AB = PY |B,
and finally NS is derived.
Therefore, according to our former discussion, we believe that this is not a legitimate
expression of the free will, and also the results of this work are not as general as stated.
Notice that, to motivate their mathematical expression of the free will, the authors of [18]
mention how J.S. Bell affirmed characterized the concept of free variables [19]:
for me this means that the values of such variables have implications only in
their future light cones.
However, “having no implications” is not the same as “being uncorrelated”. The fact that
I decide to go out with my umbrella is correlated with the weather forecasts, but it has
not implications on them. Therefore, in our opinion, the expression of the free will adopted
in [18] does not expresses the Bell’s point of view, and is not adequate.
For maximally entangled states, there is independent evidence that no theory consistent
with quantum mechanics can produce probabilities differing from those predicted by the
quantum theory [20–23]. Nonetheless, this result is in general false for non-maximally en-
tangled states [10]. Notice that, in [18], the predictive equivalence between the quantum
theory and the underlying model, in the case of non-maximally entangled states, is obtained
by reducing this case to that of maximally entangled states. This step relies on the extra
resource of embezzling states, a special set of states whose precise characterization requires
an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space [24]. By using these states, the two experimenters
can transform an arbitrary state of some Hilbert space into a maximally entangled state
of the same Hilbert space, via local operations. We believe that the use of this resource
is not legitimate in this context, since it does not allow a self-contained description of any
finite-dimensional Hilbert space.
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We conclude that the issue of completeness of quantum mechanics, and the problem of
the interpretation of the quantum state vector, are still open.
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